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WRIGHT CONTRA MCDOWELL 
ON PERCEPTUAL KNOWLEDGE AND SCEPTICISM 
 
 
DUNCAN PRITCHARD 
University of Edinburgh 
 
 
ABSTRACT. One of the key debates in contemporary epistemology is that between Crispin 
Wright and John McDowell on the topic of radical scepticism. Whereas both of them endorse a 
form of epistemic internalism, the very different internalist conceptions of perceptual 
knowledge that they offer lead them to draw radically different conclusions when it comes to 
the sceptical problem. The aim of this paper is to maintain that McDowell’s view, at least when 
suitably supplemented with further argumentation (argumentation that he may or may not agree 
with), can be shown to be a viable alternative to Wright’s anti-sceptical proposal, one that 
retains the driving motivation behind Wright’s proposal while avoiding one of its most 
fundamental problems. Wright’s wholesale rejection of the McDowellian anti-sceptical strategy 
is thus premature.   
 
 
KEYWORDS: Discrimination; Epistemic Externalism/Internalism Distinction; Epistemology; 
Reasons; Scepticism. 
 
 
0. In a number of rightly influential articles, Crispin Wright (1985; 1991; 2000; 2002; 2003a; 
2003b; 2004a; 2004b; 2004c) has argued for a distinctive epistemological proposal, one that 
has implications, amongst other things, for the perennial debate regarding scepticism. The 
purpose of this essay is to cast light on one issue raised by Wright’s work in this respect 
which I think is particularly significant. This issue is the status of the very different approach 
to scepticism sketchedfor it is merely sketchedby John McDowell (e.g., 1982; 1986; 
1994; 1995; 2002a; forthcoming), and which Wright goes to great lengths to distance his own 
anti-sceptical strategy from.  
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1. Central to Wright’s programme is a certain conception of what gives rise to the sceptical 
problem. In particular, Wright argues that the main sceptical argumentsboth Humean and 
Cartesianmake use of what he calls a ‘I-II-III’ structure. Consider the following ‘Moorean’ 
anti-sceptical argument:1 
 
Type-I Proposition:  It seems to S as if she has two hands. 
Type-II Proposition: S has two hands. 
Type-III Proposition: S is not a brain in a vat (BIV).2 
 
Notice that the type-I proposition in effect describes the evidential position that S is in, at 
least as Wright sees it (more on this below). Moreover, it is crucial that this evidence offers 
merely prima facie evidential support for belief in the type-II proposition, and certainly does 
not entail the truth of this proposition. The type-III proposition, in contrast, is entailed by the 
type-II proposition. The sceptical problem is made vivid, according to Wright, once one 
notices that the prima facie evidence that S has for believing the type-II 
propositionencapsulated in the type-I propositionis only ultima facie good evidence in 
this regard provided that S already has independent grounds for believing that she is not a 
BIV. After all, that it seems to S as if she has two hands is only good reason for believing that 
she actually does have two hands provided that she can reasonably treat the way the world 
seems to be as a guide to how the world is. If the BIV hypothesis is true, however, then the 
way the world seems is no guide at all as to how the world is, and hence the inference to 
belief in the type-III proposition is illegitimate if it is undertaken merely on this basis.  
The sceptical crux of the matter is that the required independent grounds are not to be 
had and that, furthermore, there is no other route to knowledge of the type-III proposition 
than via this I-II-III inferential route. Moreover, the import of putting this point in terms of a 
schematic I-II-III structure is to highlight that this problem is not peculiar to this case, but 
arises for any argument which has the same relevant features. If all this is correct then 
scepticism seems to quickly follow, since our knowledge of both type-II and type-III 
propositions is now called into question.  
One way of disputing the sceptical reasoning here is to reject the (restricted form of) 
evidentialism in play. That is, it is taken as given in the sceptic’s reasoning that if the type-II 
and type-III propositions are to be known at all, then they are known in virtue of the agent’s 
possession of appropriate supporting evidence. One might find this thesis independently 
questionable, however, especially since it is certainly contentious to suppose that all 
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empirical knowledge is evidentially grounded.  
In effect, this is the route that Wright takes, though he does not put the point in quite 
these terms. He argues that we need to allow that some epistemic support“warrant”, as he 
calls itcan be possessed even in the absence of supporting evidence. In particular, he 
argues that the special ‘framework’ role that type-III propositions playsuch that they need 
to be known in order for much of our knowledge to be possible, and yet there is no adequate 
way of providing inferential epistemic support for belief in such propositionsenjoins us to 
treat them as having a special epistemic status such that the epistemic support they enjoy is 
default and thereby non-evidential“unearned” as Wright terms it.3 
By allowing that our beliefs in type-III propositions are epistemically unsupported in 
this way, Wright is making a large concession to the sceptic. Nevertheless, his argument is 
that such a concession is essential to any response to the sceptical problem and thus that we 
must learn to live with it, where this means learning to work around some of the problems 
that it generates. I will here briefly describe two of these problems in order to provide a 
flavour of the difficulties facing the view.  
For example, notice that for Wright’s anti-sceptical strategy to work it is essential that 
the unearned ‘warrant’ in question be genuinely knowledge-supporting, since if it amounts to 
less than this then this will allow the sceptical problem to re-emerge. In order to see this, we 
just need to note the plausibility of the closure principle for knowledge which for our 
purposes can be formulated as follows: 
 
Closure for Knowledge 
If S knows p and S competently deduces q from p, thereby coming to believe q on this basis while 
retaining her knowledge of p, then S knows q.4 
 
With closure in play, provided that we agree with the sceptic that we are unable to know the 
target type-III proposition then it followsat least given that the competent deduction in 
question is not in doubt, as I take it isn’tthat we are unable to know the type-II proposition 
as well, and that is tantamount to scepticism. Simply using the ‘unearned warrant’ strategy to 
rescue a positive epistemic standing as regards belief in the type-III proposition that falls 
short of knowledge will do nothing to mitigate scepticism of this sort. The problem, however, 
is that since it is essential to Wright’s proposal that one lacks any good reason for supposing 
that the type-III proposition is true, it is far from obvious how it could be that the unearned 
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warrant that one has for belief in this proposition could ever be robust enough to be 
knowledge-supporting. 
 Moreover, it also important to the strategy that the unearned warrant is of a sort that 
could legitimately support belief in the type-III proposition, rather than some distinct 
propositional attitude like acceptance. After all, if knowledge entails belief, as many 
suppose,5 then it follows that if one may not legitimately believe the target proposition then 
one cannot know it, and the closure-based scepticism just canvassed will then immediately 
resurface. The problem, howeveras Wright (e.g., 2004c, §2) recognisesis that the 
strategy in question does not obviously license belief in the type-III proposition since it is 
part and parcel of the strategy to allow that one has no good reason for thinking that this 
proposition is true. But given the truth-directed nature of belief, it is hard then to see how a 
rational agent could legitimately believeas opposed to merely accept, saya type-III 
proposition on this basis. 
 Perhaps these problems, and others like them, can be surmounted. It is certainly true 
that Wright has some compelling things to say about these issues. What I am interested in for 
the purposes of this paper, however, is whether an epistemic internalist like Wright needs to 
make this concession to the sceptic in the first place, for if this concession can be avoided 
then that would surely be a preferable way of dealing with the sceptical problem. This is 
where the debate between Wright and McDowell becomes salient, for McDowell explicitly 
offers an anti-sceptical conception of perceptual knowledge which, while also being 
epistemically internalist, does not make this key concession to the sceptic. Wright has argued 
that McDowell’s strategy is incoherent. I will argue that it is far more plausible than Wright 
supposes.  
 
 
2. McDowell’s approach to scepticism is meant to explicitly disallow the possibility of such a 
I-II-III argument for scepticism ever getting off the blocks. The reason for this is that 
McDowell claims that at least in paradigm cases in which one has perceptual knowledge the 
rational support that one’s belief in the target proposition enjoys is factivei.e., it entails the 
target proposition. For example, McDowell claims that in paradigm cases of perceptual 
knowledge one’s rational support for one’s belief in the target proposition, p, is that one sees 
that p is the case, where seeing that p entails p.  
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What is significant about this conception of factive rational support is that it enables 
one’s belief in the relevant type-II propositionin the case under consideration, that one has 
two handsto enjoy an epistemic support which, unlike the support offered by the relevant 
type-I proposition (that it seems to one as if one has two hands) entails the target proposition. 
Accordingly, the epistemic standing of one’s belief in the type-II proposition is not hostage to 
one’s lack of independent grounds for believing the type-III proposition, and hence the I-II-
III sceptical problem is unable to get a grip.  
There is thus no need for McDowell to make the kind of concession to the sceptic that 
we saw Wright making above in the light of the challenge posed by the I-II-III argument. 
Moreover, it is not as if McDowell evades this problem by opting for a form of epistemic 
externalism.6 On the contrary, central to his proposal is a thorough-going commitment to 
epistemic internalism: by McDowell’s lights, the rational support one has for one’s belief is 
by its nature reflectively accessible.7,8  
 
 
3. There are a number of features of this view that are contentious. To begin with we need to 
notice that agents are only in a position to possess factive epistemic support of this sort for 
their beliefs in epistemically friendly environments. In contrast, in epistemically unfriendly 
environmentswhere, say, there is undetectable deception taking placeeven if the agent 
happens to form a true belief via her perceptual faculties, she will still not thereby acquire 
factive epistemic support of the relevant kind. Instead, the epistemic support that her belief 
enjoys will be of a type-I sort, in that she will only seem to see that p, an epistemic standing 
which is clearly not factive. In short, then, seeing that p is epistemic in the sense that it puts 
one in a position to know such that environments which would by their nature frustrate such 
knowledge are thereby environments in which one is unable to see that p.9  
Call an epistemically friendly environment ‘the good case’, and call an epistemically 
unfriendly environment ‘the bad case’. According to McDowell, in the good case the 
epistemic support one’s belief enjoys can be factive and yet in the corresponding bad case 
(i.e., the environment is no longer epistemically friendly but everything else about it stays the 
same) the epistemic support one’s belief enjoys is non-factive. The reason why this is thought 
controversial is that every party to this debateincluding McDowellgrants that the good 
and the bad cases may well be indistinguishable to the agent. The worry, then, concerns how 
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the type of reflectively accessible rational support that one’s belief enjoys on the 
McDowellian picture can nevertheless be contingent on factors obtaining (i.e., whether or not 
one is in the good case) which one is not in a position to determine have obtained. In short, 
the concern is that epistemic internalism is incompatible with such a conception of factive 
epistemic support, and thus that if one wishes to endorse epistemic internalism then one is 
obliged to opt for a much weaker conception of epistemic support, one which is more in 
keeping with that offered by Wright. 
Indeed, Wright (e.g., 2002, §10) takes this line with McDowell himself. He argues 
that since even McDowell grants that one cannot tell the difference between the good case 
and the bad case it follows that the only rational support for one’s belief that is reflectively 
accessible to one is that either one is in the good case and in possession of factive reason in 
support of one’s belief or one is in the bad case and so being undetectably deceived. 
Epistemic support of this disjunctive variety is, however, non-factive, and thus McDowell is 
unable to block the I-II-III argument by appeal to the distinctive epistemic support that one 
has for one’s perceptual beliefs in good cases. 
I take it that we can re-cast the argument that is implicitly in play here as follows: 
 
(1) In the bad case, the reflectively accessible epistemic support one’s belief enjoys is non-
factive.  
(2) One cannot tell the difference between the good case and the bad case. 
(C) In the good case, the reflectively accessible epistemic support one’s belief enjoys is non-
factive. 
 
That is, given that one cannot tell the difference between the good and the bad case, it follows 
that the reflectively accessible epistemic support one’s belief enjoys can be no better than it 
would be in the bad case, even if one is in fact in the good case.  
It is precisely this line of reasoning that McDowell rejects, however, since he 
explicitly argues that we should not allow one’s epistemic standing in the bad case to 
determine one’s epistemic standing in the good case. Indeed, McDowell is quite explicit that 
because in the good case the epistemic standing of one’s belief can involve the possession of 
reflectively accessible factive grounds this epistemic support is not dependent upon any 
further inaccessible factors at all. That is, once one is in possession of such epistemic support 
for one’s belief then there is no gap between epistemic support and fact at all, and thus there 
is no fissure between epistemic support and fact that would need to be ‘bridged’ by further 
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epistemic support. Furthermore, McDowell argues that it is the collective failure amongst 
contemporary epistemologists to recognise that (1) and (2) fails to entail (C) that has led them 
to succumb to the sceptical problematic in the first place, at least where the sceptical 
argument is amenable to a I-II-III characterisation.  
 What we have here is, I think, a fundamental clash of intuition. On the one side, there 
are those like Wright who hold that McDowell is guilty of an obvious philosophical error; on 
the other side there is McDowell insisting that no error has been made and (presumably) 
regarding himself as being read unsympathetically. In order to adjudicate this debate it is 
necessary to dig a little deeper regarding the putative problems facing McDowell’s view. 
There is an excellent rationale for taking the trouble to explore a position that McDowell 
himself offers so little argumentative support for. This is that if the McDowellian proposal 
could be made palatable then it would constitute the holy grail of epistemology, in that it is 
offering a bona fide internalist conception of knowledge which is able to nonetheless allow 
that the rational support that one’s belief enjoys can be genuinely truth-connected and thus 
sceptic-proof. This is a bewitching combination of theses, and certainly a proposal that is 
worth exploring further. Moreover, for our purposes it is also worth noting that 
manyincluding Wrightwould surely accept that if McDowell’s view were viable, then it 
would constitute a direct and elegant response to the problem of scepticism, a response that 
would, indeed, avoid many of the problems facing Wright’s own anti-sceptical proposal 
precisely because it does not make the concession to the sceptic that we saw Wright making 
above.  
 
 
4. I take it that one key worry which underlies the charge that McDowell’s epistemic 
internalism is incompatible with his account of factive epistemic support is that the view is 
subject to a ‘McKinsey’-style problem. In standard McKinsey-style arguments an agent has 
reflective access to the wide contents of her thoughts and then, via her a priori knowledge of 
some suitable form of content externalism, she is able to competently deduce that a certain 
empirical proposition (previously unknown) is true. In this way the agent comes to acquire 
knowledge of an empirical proposition via a completely non-empirical route, and therein lies 
the puzzle, since it seems that empirical knowledge cannot be acquired in this way.10  
 A similar sort of problem may be thought to beset McDowell’s proposal. After all, if 
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one has reflective access to the factive reason one possesses in support of one’s perceptual 
belief, and one also knowsa priori, presumablythat one is only able to possess factive 
epistemic support provided that one is in the good case, then surely one is able to 
competently deduce that one is in the good case. Moreover, the knowledge that results from 
this competent deduction will be of an empirical proposition and yet, nonetheless, seems to 
have been acquired in an entirely non-empirical fashion.  
 I think that it is, in part at least, a worry of this sort that prompts some commentators, 
such as Wright, to suppose that McDowell’s proposal to allow reflectively accessible and yet 
factive support reasons cannot be taken at face-value. Significantly, however, although 
McDowell does not himself comment onor even recognisethis problem, as it happens he 
does have the resources available to him to defuse this difficulty. 
 In order to see this, we need to note that what is worrying about McKinsey-style 
arguments is precisely the acquisition of non-empirical knowledge of an empirical 
proposition.11 After all, while perhaps contentious, it is far from absurd to hold that one could 
come to know, by purely non-empirical means (by reflecting on the nature of one’s empirical 
evidence, for example), that one has knowledge-supporting grounds in support of one’s belief 
in a certain empirical proposition. Given that one already has empirical knowledge of the 
target proposition, however, such a reflective process would at best deliver non-empirical 
second-order knowledge that one has empirical first-order knowledge; it would not deliver 
the first-order empirical knowledge that is advertised for the McKinsey-style argument.  
Crucially, however, it is at most only this weaker conclusion that McDowell’s 
conception of perceptual knowledge generates. In short, the reason for this is that on 
McDowell’s account of perceptual knowledge one is only able to undertake the competent 
deduction at issue in the relevant McKinsey-style reasoning provided one already has 
empirical knowledge of the target proposition, and thus there is no route via such reasoning 
to the acquisition of non-empirical knowledge of the target empirical proposition.  
This is not because McDowell holds that there is no gap between being in possession 
of a factive reason in support of one’s belief in an empirical proposition and knowing that 
proposition since on his view being in possession of the factive reason merely puts one in a 
position to know the target proposition; it does not guarantee knowledge of that proposition.12 
Nevertheless, McDowell does hold that being in possession of a factive reason and forming a 
belief in the target proposition on this basis does suffice for knowledge. Accordingly, given 
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that it is impossible to undertake the competent deduction in play in the McKinsey-style 
argument without forming a belief in the target proposition on the basis of the relevant factive 
reason, it follows that even if one is in possession of the factive reason while lacking 
empirical knowledge of the target proposition, one still cannot acquire non-empirical 
knowledge of the target proposition by undertaking the competent deduction in play in the 
McKinsey-style reasoning.13  
 
 
5. A related worry that one might have regarding McDowell’s internalist account of factive 
reasons is that although it might not be in any direct tension with the concession that agents 
cannot distinguish between good and bad cases, it can nevertheless be brought into tension 
with that concession by bringing the appropriate inference to bear. For suppose that one does 
indeed know that one has two hands in virtue of possessing a factive reason in support of this 
proposition. With one’s knowledge so supported, there can hardly be anything wrong with 
one competently deducing, and thereby coming to know, that one is not a BIV. It seems, then, 
that one knows that one has two hands rather than that one is a (handless) BIV. But how can 
that be, given that all parties to this dispute agree that one is unable to tell the difference 
between the good case in which one is genuinely looking at one’s hands, and the relevant bad 
case in which one is a BIV who merely seems to be looking at one’s hands? 
As one might expect, there is nothing in McDowell’s writings which indicates how he 
would respond to this problem, but even so there do seem to be some plausible options 
available to him in this regard. In particular, it is far from obvious on closer inspection why 
possessing better grounds in favour of believing that one scenario obtains rather than another 
known to be incompatible scenario should entail that one thereby possesses the relevant 
discriminatory abilities to distinguish between the two scenarios. Moreover, as we will now 
see, this point is independent of any claim about factive reasons.  
Imagine, for example, that one is a reasonably sophisticated individual with normal 
background beliefs and cognitive powers. Now suppose that one sees what appears to be a 
zebra in the zebra enclosure at the zoo, and so forms the belief that one is looking at a zebra. 
Given one’s background beliefs, doesn’t one have better reason for thinking that one is 
looking at a zebra rather than a cleverly disguised mule? After all, in possessing these 
background beliefs one is aware of a number of epistemically relevant considerations, such as 
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the low likelihood of such a deception occurring, the penalties involved were one to be 
caught undertaking such a deception, the likelihood that such a deception would be found 
out, and so on. These considerations, when coupled with one’s perceptual evidence for 
believing that one is faced with a zebraeven when that evidence is construed non-
factivelysurely supply one with better reason for believing the target proposition over the 
specified error-possibility. Nevertheless, this is entirely consistent with one lacking the 
relevant discriminative abilitiesviz., the ability to discriminate between zebras and cleverly 
disguised mules.14  
Insofar as one is willing to grant that one might have better reason to believe that one 
scenario obtains rather than a known to be incompatible scenario even while lacking the 
relevant discriminatory abilities, then one ought not to find the McDowellian picture of 
perceptual knowledge in this respect all that puzzling. In the good case, one has grounds 
which decisively favour one’s belief in the target proposition over belief in the alternative 
sceptical hypothesis even though one is unable to tell the difference between being in the 
good case and being in the corresponding sceptical bad case. But given the distinction just 
drawn, there is nothing inherently mysterious about that. 
 
 
6. This distinction between what we might term ‘favouring’ as opposed to ‘discriminating’ 
epistemic support is vital when it comes to applying McDowell’s account of perceptual 
knowledge to the sceptical problem. On the standard account of type-III propositions, it is 
held that one has no good reflectively accessible grounds in favour of believing them at all, 
and thus any claim to the contrarysuch as McDowell’slooks immediately suspect. But 
McDowell does have a plausible story to tell regarding how such grounds could be possessed, 
at least provided that the distinction between favouring and discriminating epistemic support 
is in place. For while it is certainly true that that there are no reflectively accessible 
discriminating reasons available in support of one’s beliefs in type-III propositionsi.e., 
reasons for thinking that one can undertake the relevant discrimination between the non-
sceptical and the corresponding sceptical scenarioit does not follow on this view that there 
are not adequate reflectively accessible favouring reasons available.  
Moreover, according to McDowell, in the good case such favouring reasons could 
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well be factivesuch that they entail the falsity of the relevant sceptical hypotheses. If this is 
right, then it is hard to see why they should not suffice to support the relevant anti-sceptical 
knowledge. Since Wright does not recognise that this dialectical option is available to 
McDowell, he is too quick to suppose, contra McDowell, that the only relevant reflectively 
accessible grounds available to the subject must be non-factive grounds.15 
 
 
7. Furthermore, this distinction between favouring and discriminating epistemic support is 
essential to understanding why the argument from (1) and (2) to (C) outlined above fails to 
go through by McDowellian lights. True to form, McDowell in effect simply denies the 
intuitions in play here and proffers an alternative picture of perceptual knowledge in support 
of his opposing viewpoint. It would obviously be better, however, if one could deal with the 
intuitions that motivate this argument head-on. 
 This is just what the distinction between favouring and discriminating epistemic 
support allows us to do, since we can now see that there is an equivocation in the argument. 
Whereas (1) and (C) are simply talking about epistemic support simpliciter, (2) is clearly 
referring to specifically discriminatory epistemic support. Accepting (1) and (2) is therefore 
compatible with holding that one lacks reflectively accessible discriminatory epistemic 
support in the good case, something that McDowell would not dispute. Crucially, however, it 
does not commit one to holding that one lacks favouring epistemic support in the good case, 
including favouring epistemic support which is factive.  
 
 
8. A final worry that one might have about the McDowellian strategy concerns whether or 
not it is permissible by the lights of this view to explicitly argue for anti-sceptical knowledge 
by appeal to factive reasons, and thereby claim knowledge in the denials of sceptical 
hypotheses as a result. Wright is, I think, rightly suspicious of this apparent consequence of 
the McDowellian strategy (see, e.g., Wright forthcoming, §5). After all, arguing for anti-
sceptical knowledge on this basis does seem illegitimate. Moreover, claims to know the 
denials of sceptical hypotheses always jar on the ear. The problem for McDowell, however, is 
to explain why such apparent dialectical illegitimacy and conversational impropriety exists, 
since surely the factive reasons in play ought to be more than enough to ensure that this is not 
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the case.  
 Indeed, McDowell seems to be at least implicitly aware of this problem, even though 
he does not engage with it head-on, for he is clearly reluctant to actually draw the relevant 
anti-sceptical implication of his view himself, even though he argues that his account of 
perceptual knowledge does suffice to deal with the sceptical problem.16 This is not a 
satisfactory situation, however, for some account is needed of why, on this view, drawing 
such conclusions is seemingly both dialectically illegitimate and conversationally improper. 
 Perhaps, though, there is an explanation at hand here which is consistent with the 
McDowellian account of perceptual knowledge. Indeed, the explanation seems to also fit 
very neatly with the distinction just drawn between favouring and discriminatory epistemic 
support. Let us take the conversational impropriety of the anti-sceptical assertions first.  
In claiming to know a proposition one typically at least (if not universally) represents 
oneself as possessing adequate and relevant evidence in favour of that assertion. Moreover, 
when it comes to claims to know which concern the denials of error-possibilitiessuch as ‘I 
know that I am not a BIV’then the evidence in question is almost always evidence which 
would indicate that you could make the relevant discriminations.  
To see this, imagine that one were to hear someone claim, without qualification, that 
they know that the zebra-shaped object over there is not a cleverly disguised mule. Wouldn’t 
you take them to be representing themselves as being able to offer supporting grounds for 
their assertion which would show that they are able to discriminate between zebras and 
cleverly disguised mules (e.g., that they have special training, or have made special checks)? 
If this is right, then we should expect the same to apply when it comes to claims to know the 
denials of sceptical hypotheses, in that in making such an assertion one represents oneself as 
being able to offer grounds which would indicate that one could discriminate between, say, 
having two hands and being envatted and merely seeming to have two hands. The problem, 
however, is that such grounds are not available, by anyone’s lights, and thus assertions of this 
sort are by their nature problematic (unlike the corresponding ‘cleverly disguised mule’ 
assertions).17 Thus, the distinction drawn above between favouring and discriminatory 
epistemic support can again work in McDowell’s favour. 
 
 
9. This still leaves the apparent illegitimacy of drawing the anti-sceptical conclusion. Notice, 
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however, that an argument can be perfectly goodin the sense that it leads one to new 
knowledgewhile nevertheless being dialectically ineffective. The paradigm case of this, as 
Wright (e.g., 2002, §2) notes, is that of question-begging arguments. One type of question-
begging argument is where one groundlessly assumes, in one’s premises, a claim that one’s 
dialectic opponent will not accept. Accordingly, the conclusion that one draws from those 
premises will inevitably be dialectically impotent even if, provided the premises are known 
and the deduction competent, the agent will come to know the conclusion through this 
reasoning. Question-begging of this sort is certainly a vice. Is it, however, a vice that 
McDowell succumbs to? 
Given the limited argumentative support that McDowell offers in favour of his view, 
it is fair to charge him with this dialectical vice. Notice, however, that we can distinguish in 
this regard between McDowell’s own writings on this topic and the McDowellian response to 
scepticism, where the latter includes the additional argumentation offered here 
(argumentation that McDowell doesn’t give). With this additional argumentation in play, it is 
far from obvious that any specifically dialectical vice is being displayed.  
  
 
10. In short, then, my claim is that Wright has not given McDowell’s strategy a proper run 
for its money and that, once we add the further theses to McDowell’s view that I have 
described here, there are grounds for supposing that his strategy is at least viable (which is 
not of course to say that it is right). Furthermore, McDowell’s proposal is able to avoid the 
key concession to the sceptic that Wright makes, and which creates so many problems for his 
view, even whilst staying within the confines of a thorough-going epistemic internalism. 
There is thus far more to commend the McDowellian anti-sceptical strategy than Wright 
supposes.  
It is crucial to remember, however, that McDowell himself never explicitly offers this 
further supporting argument, and rests content instead to offer his view in a broadly quietistic 
manner (as if simply outlining the main contours of the position would suffice for his 
audience to recognise its truth, and thereby exit the fly-bottle of scepticism). Perhaps there 
are some philosophical issues that are best approached in this manner, but scepticism is not 
one of them, and Wright does us all a service by ensuring that McDowell is further pressed 
on this score. Moreover, by approaching this issue in this way McDowell has unintentionally 
 14 
managed to sabotage interest in the style of anti-scepticism that he recommends. Since, as we 
have seen here, his proposal is in fact far more plausible than it first appears, this is a most 
unfortunate result.18,19 
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NOTES 
 
1  This is not actually an argument that Moore himself ever offered, of course, but it does bear certain structural 
analogies to the famous anti-sceptical offered by Moore (1939).  
2  Following Moore (1939), Wright and McDowell typically focus in this regard not on the denial of a sceptical 
hypothesis but on the thesis that there is an external world (although this is itself in effect the denial of the 
sceptical hypothesis that there is no external world). While the distinction is, of course, philosophically 
important, for our purposes the denial of any radical sceptical hypothesis will do and since the BIV 
hypothesissuitably understood, at any ratedoes not raise the same sort of metaphysical issues as the 
hypothesis that there is no external world, we will confine our attention to this error-possibility.  
3  Wright sees a precursor to this approach in Wittgenstein’s (1969) famous remarks on “hinge propositions”. 
Personally, I have my doubts whether it is wise to read the Wittgensteinian anti-sceptical strategy in this way, 
but I will not expand on this issue here. For further critical discussion of Wright’s construal of hinge 
propositions, see Pritchard (2005; forthcomingc) and Williams (forthcoming).  
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4  This is, of course, the standard Williamson-Hawthorne way of defining single-premise closure for knowledge. 
See Williamson (2000, 117) and Hawthorne (2005).  
5  Even those, like Williamson (2000), who argue that knowledge cannot be analysed into belief plus some 
further condition(s). See Williamson (2000, 202).  
6  This is, for example, effectively how Williamson (2000, ch. 8) avoids the problem. Like McDowell, he argues 
that the epistemic support one’s belief enjoys can be factive; unlike McDowell, he lodges this conception of 
factive epistemic support within an externalist epistemology. 
7  For textual support for the thesis that McDowell endorses a form of epistemic internalism, see Neta & 
Pritchard (2007). 
8  Notice that I have here described McDowell’s view in exclusively epistemological terms. This is important 
because often he is readespecially by Wright (e.g., forthcoming)as primarily offering a metaphysical thesis 
about the nature of perceptual experience. While it is true that there is a live ‘disjunctivist’ metaphysical 
proposal of this sort in the literature which is inspired (in part at least) by McDowell’s writings on perceptual 
knowledgesee, for example, Martin (e.g., 2003; 2004)the role, if any, that this metaphysical thesis plays in 
McDowell’s response to scepticism is far from clear. Indeed, as I note elsewheresee, e.g., Pritchard 
(forthcomingb)the corresponding metaphysical thesis seems largely inessential to McDowell’s view in this 
regard. Accordingly, in what follows I will treat McDowell’s disjunctivist view as primarily an epistemological 
thesis. 
9  In contrast, notice that on this view one can see an object without that putting one in a position to know. For 
example, suppose that I am in the famous ‘barn façade county’ in which almost every barn-shaped object is in 
fact an undetectable fake. Even if I happen to look at the one real barn in that environment, I cannot come to 
know that what I see is a barn and, relatedly, I cannot see that there is a barn before me. Nevertheless, I do see a 
barn.  
10  The literature on McKinsey-style arguments is now vast. For an excellent collection of articles on this topic, 
see Nuccetelli (2003).   
11  More precisely, it is the acquisition of non-empirical knowledge of an empirical proposition which makes a 
very specific empirical claim. After all, it is telling that transcendental arguments are not usually charged as 
succumbing to the McKinsey problem (though they are controversial in other respects of course).  
12  Stroud (2002) reads McDowell as offering the view that if one sees that p then one knows that p. See 
McDowell (2002b) for a rejection of this reading. 
13  See Neta & Pritchard (2007) for the full argument. 
14  For more on this distinction and its epistemological ramifications, see Pritchard (2007).  
15  See, for example, Wright (2002, §10) where he moves quickly from the claim that the sceptical scenario is 
“subjectively indistinguishable” from the corresponding non-sceptical scenarioi.e., the agent lacks the 
relevant discriminatory abilitiesto the claim that the rational support for the agent’s belief in the type-II 
propositionand hence, ultimately, the type-III proposition as wellis properly encapsulated in the non-factive 
evidence at issue in the type-I proposition.  
16  As McDowell (1995, 888) writes at one point, his anti-sceptical proposal is “not well cast as an answer to 
skeptical challenges; it is more like a justification of a refusal to bother with them”. 
17  It is not as if one can simply cancel the relevant implicature either, since what would possibly motivate an 
assertion like ‘I know that I am not a BIV, but I can’t distinguish normal experiences from BIV-generated 
experiences’? In the right circumstances such an assertion would be true, non-misleading, and supported by 
appropriate evidence. Since it would not respond to any particular conversational move, however, it would also 
be pointless and thus at least to this extent incoherent (like saying ‘good morning’ in the middle of a 
conversation (cf. Wittgenstein 1969, §464)). 
18  For further discussion of my reading of the McDowellian account of perceptual knowledge and its 
application to the sceptical problem, see Pritchard (forthcominga; forthcomingb). 
19  Thanks to Jesper Kallestrup and Sven Rosenkranz for feedback on an earlier version of this paper. 
